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introduction
The Republic of the Philippines (Philippines) became independent in 1946, throwing off over 300 years of Spanish rule and another 50 years of American rule. 
However, the legacy of colonialism lives on in Philippine laws. 
As with all former colonies, the Philippine legal system reflects 
its multi-layered history. For women, this has meant the continu-
ation of oppressive patriarchal laws, legitimizing their husband’s 
rule over them. This dynamic stands in stark contrast to the 
equality of rights for men and women codified in the Philippine 
Constitution and international human rights treaties the country 
has ratified.
The Spanish Civil Code 
of 1889 continues to shape 
family relations and curtail 
women’s capacities. Although 
the Philippine Family Code 
(Family Code) eliminated 
some of the Civil Code’s 
most egregious legacies, 
women are still deprived 
of equal parental authority 
and property rights. Muslim 
women further do not ben-
efit from the Family Code’s 
advancements because they 
are subject to a separate Code 
of Muslim Personal Laws 
(Muslim Code), which closely mirrors the pre-revision Civil 
Code. Additionally, Muslim women are denied the ability to 
choose their profession, domestic role, and residence, and 
receive limited access to courts.
In May 2006, the Xavier University Center for Legal 
Assistance, with support from the Georgetown University Law 
Center’s International Women’s Human Rights Clinic, filed a 
lawsuit on behalf of twelve petitioners challenging discrimina-
tory provisions of the Family and Muslim Codes.1 Although the 
petitioners come from different parts of the Philippines, have 
different religions, and speak various dialects, they express com-
mon outrage at laws that deny women equality and treat them as 
minors. In January 2010, almost four years after the initiation 
of Asjari v. Ermita, the trial court dismissed the case, declar-
ing its “hope that petitioners’ quixotic search for their desired 
equality end soonest.”2 Petitioners are now bringing this case 
before the Philippine Commission on Human Rights, recently 
empowered by the Magna Carta of Women to act as the Gender 
and Development Ombud.3 
This case has international significance because it aims to 
set a precedent for enforcement of women’s human rights in 
country constitutions and ratified treaties. Only if cases are 
brought challenging older, non-conforming statutes, will these 
provisions have meaning. 
Domestic courts play a vital 
role in the interpretation and 
enforcement of international 
treaty provisions because they 
have greater capacity to take 
cases and come with estab-
lished enforcement mecha-
nisms. International treaty 
bodies are, in fact, set up as 
a forum of last resort, requir-
ing exhaustion of domestic 
remedies.4 This case further 
confronts the pitting of culture 
and religion against women’s 
human rights. Culture is a 
fluid concept subject to manipulation by those in power and 
should never be used to deny a population basic rights.5 Here, 
what the Philippine government calls Muslim religion and cul-
ture is actually a product of Spanish colonialism. 
This paper is divided into four main parts. The first part pres-
ents a historical overview of the relevant laws, which reflect the 
interplay between colonialism, nationalism, minority protection, 
and patriarchy. The second part provides a constitutional and 
international law analysis of the challenged provisions. The third 
part responds to counterarguments that the challenged provisions 
further government interest in protecting family harmony, culture, 
and Muslim religion. The last part describes the harms to women’s 
physical integrity and dignity caused by the current regime.
hiStorical oVerView of releVant law
the ciVil code, family code, and muSlim code
The Civil Code of the Philippines, promulgated in 1949, bor-
rowed heavily from the Spanish Civil Code of 1889. According 
* This article grew out of a collaboration between the Xavier 
University Center for Legal Assistance (XUCLA) and the Georgetown 
University Law Center’s International Women’s Human Rights Clinic, 
directed by Professor Susan Deller Ross. At the start of this project, 
Arwen Joyce and Priscila McCalley were Clinic students who worked 
under the supervision of Clinic attorney-fellow, Tamar Ezer, and 
XUCLA attorney, Neil Pacamalan.
[T]he trial court dismissed 
the case, declaring its “hope 
that petitioners’ quixotic 
search for their desired 
equality end soonest.”
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to Justice Romero of the Philippine Supreme Court, “Spain, a 
conservative, Catholic country . . . transplanted to our shores the 
Old World culture, mores, attitudes and values.”6 The Civil Code 
enshrined these mores, attitudes, and values in law, including 
“such concepts as the husband’s being the head of the family 
and the wife’s subordination to his authority.”7 In the 1980s, 
however, Spain “completely revised” its family law to make it 
compatible with “the equality of all persons before the law.”8
The Philippines also took steps to reform the Civil Code and 
adopt a new Family Code.9 A Civil Code Revision Committee 
worked to address “the unsuitability of certain provisions . . . , 
implanted from foreign sources . . . the unfairness, unjustness, and 
gaps or inadequacies of others; and the need to attune them to con-
temporary developments and trends.”10 The reform further aimed 
to ensure compliance with the new Constitution11 and to “eman-
cipate the wife from the exclusive control of the husband and to 
place her at parity with him insofar as the family is concerned.”12 
President Corazon Aquino accepted the Committees’ recommen-
dations and signed the Family Code into law in July 1987.13
Many hailed the Family Code as a victory for women’s 
rights. Justice Puno commented: “Taking the lead in Asia, our 
government exerted efforts . . .  to eliminate inequality between 
men and women in our land. The watershed came . . . when 
our Family Code took effect which . . . terminated the unequal 
treatment of husband and wife as to their rights and respon-
sibilities.”14 For the first time, a woman could exercise “any 
legitimate profession”15 without her husband’s consent and help 
select the family’s residence.16 The Family Code also removed 
restrictions on a woman’s ability to sue independently of her 
husband,17 acquire property without his consent,18 and remarry 
without losing parental authority over children.19
Despite these advances, a number of discriminatory provi-
sions remain in the Family Code. As the Philippine Government 
acknowledged in a report to the Committee for the Elimination 
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW Committee), 
“[although] the Family Code removed many of the discrimi-
natory provisions under the Civil Code . . . it did not address 
anti-women bias in the area of marriage and family . . . . These 
keep Filipino women, regardless of ethnicity or religion, on 
an unequal status to men in marriage and family relations.”20 
Specifically, the Family Code continues to limit a woman’s 
parental authority over her children and her control over family 
property.21 In June 2004, Philippine Senator Manuel B. Villar, 
Jr. proposed to amend these article by removing “in case of 
disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail,” and substi-
tuting “in case of disagreement, either party shall go to court 
for proper remedy.”22 In August 2004, the legislative proposal 
was referred to two Senate committees,23 but neither has taken 
action.
The Muslim Code, promulgated by Presidential Decree in 
1977,24 operates as a parallel set of family law provisions for 
the Muslim population of the Philippines.25 The Muslim Code 
contains many provisions mirroring those in the pre-revision 
Civil Code. For instance, under both Codes, a woman may not 
share domestic roles equally with her husband, 26 choose her 
residence, 27 or keep parental authority over her children if her 
husband dies and she remarries.28 Additionally, both Codes 
restrict women’s economic power by limiting their access to 
the court system,29 their ability to seek employment outside the 
home,30 and their right to inherit property.31
the conStitution and organic act
In 1987, the Philippines adopted a new constitution with 
provisions protecting human rights and providing equal rights 
for women. In addition to an equal protection clause,32 the 1987 
Constitution “recognizes the role of women in nation-building” 
and “the fundamental equality before the law of women and 
men.”33 It also pledges to “give highest priority” to enacting 
measures protecting “the right of all the people to human dig-
nity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and 
remove cultural inequities.”34
The updated Constitution additionally differs in its approach 
to the Muslim minority. The 1973 Constitution required the state 
to “consider the customs, traditions, beliefs and interests of national 
cultural communities in the formulation and implementation of state 
policies.”35 Instead, the new Constitution set up an autonomous 
region in Mindanao and called for an Organic Act36 “consistent with 
the . . . Constitution and national laws” to govern Muslims.37
The Organic Act for the Autonomous Region of Muslim 
Mindanao (Organic Act) was passed in 1989. The Organic 
Act echoes the equal rights and non-discrimination guarantees 
of the Constitution, committing the Regional Government to 
“uphold and protect the fundamental rights of women . . . .”38 
Specifically, it requires that, “In no case shall women . . . be 
exploited, abused or discriminated against.”39 It also expresses 
the legislature’s intention to revise the Muslim Code within one 
year.40 As of yet, this revision has not been carried out.41
[U]nder both Codes, a woman may not share domestic 
roles equally with her husband, choose her residence, or 
keep parental authority over her children if her husband 
dies and she remarries.
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The Philippines has espoused human rights, founded upon 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).42 The 
Constitution accepts “principles of international law as part 
of the law of the land”43 and binds the Philippines “to imple-
ment [the] spirit and letter” of treaties it has ratified.44 The core 
international human rights treaties to which the Philippines is a 
party include: the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in 1974,45 the Convention on 
the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW) in 1981,46 the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1986,47 and the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC) in 1990.48 The government submits 
periodic reports to the committees that monitor compliance 
with these treaties49 and has made changes to domestic law and 
policy in light of committee 
recommendations.50
the magna carta of 
women
Most recently, in September 
2009, the Philippines passed 
the Magna Carta of Women, 
a comprehensive women’s 
human rights law. The law 
was enacted to “promote 
empowerment of women” and 
commits the government to 
“intensify efforts” to ensure 
women’s human rights “espe-
cially in the marginalized sec-
tors of society.”51 It recognizes that “equality of men and women 
entails abolition of unequal structures and practices”52 and 
includes a specific section on equality of women in families 
entitled, “Equal Rights in All Matters Relating to Marriage and 
Family Relations.”53
conStitutional and international law analySiS
the family and muSlim codeS diScriminate againSt 
women
The Family and Muslim Codes violate equal protection 
guarantees in the Philippine Constitution and under international 
law, as well as specific equality protections related to raising 
children and management of property.54 The situation is worse 
for Muslim women, who are unable to share equal domestic 
roles with their husbands, decide their profession and residence, 
and freely access the court system.55 The government itself 
acknowledged that, although “the Family Code removed many 
of the discriminatory provisions under the Civil Code . . . it did 
not address anti-women bias in the area of marriage and the fam-
ily;” these laws “keep Filipino women, regardless of ethnicity 
or religion, on an unequal status to men in marriage and family 
relations.” 56
The Constitution,57 Organic Act,58 and international human 
rights treaties59 require the Philippines to honor women’s equal-
ity. The Supreme Court characterized equality as “an ideal which 
cries out for bold attention and action in the Constitution” 60 and 
the equal protection clause “as a major cutting edge to eliminate 
every conceivable irrational discrimination in our society.”61 
Justice Romero noted that the Constitution “signifies that 
women, no less than men, shall enjoy the same rights accorded 
by law.”62 Thus, “[w]hatever rights or opportunities used to be 
denied . . . are now clearly granted to them . . . [D]oors hitherto 
closed to them have been flung open.”63 
The principle of equal protection specifically applies to 
marriage and family laws, as recognized the Magna Carta of 
Women64 and international law.65 The Human Rights Committee 
explained: “The matrimonial regime [must contain] equal rights 
and obligations for both spouses, with regard to the custody 
and care of children . . . and the ownership or administration of 
property . . . . Equality during marriage implies that husband 
and wife should participate 
equally in responsibility and 
authority within the family.”66 
However, neither the 
Family nor Muslim Codes 
recognize women’s equal 
responsibility and author-
ity in the upbringing of their 
children. Under both Codes, 
“in case of disagreement, 
the father’s decision shall 
prevail.”67 This effectively 
gives sole parental authority 
to the father because it only 
honors the mother’s wishes if 
they coincide with the father’s. 
Moreover, the Muslim Code strips a widow of all parental 
authority if she remarries and her second husband is not related 
to her children.68 This not only deprives women of their parental 
role, but manipulates a woman’s attachment to her children and 
seeks to influence her choice of a second husband.69 The Muslim 
Code further denies women the opportunity to serve as mar-
riage guardian,70 proscribing preference for the father, paternal 
grandfather, brother, paternal relatives, or even a court.71 This 
discriminatory treatment of mothers violates both CEDAW and 
the CRC.72
Provisions favoring the father additionally ignore “the best 
interests of the child,” a paramount consideration under interna-
tional law.73 Inculcating gender discriminatory stereotypes also 
violates the CRC’s injunction that a child’s education should 
prepare him or her “for responsible life in a free society, in the 
spirit of . . . equality of sexes.”74
The Family and Muslim Codes similarly deny women equal 
property rights. The Family Code provides that in the adminis-
tration of marital or children’s property “[i]n case of disagree-
ment,” the husband or father’s “decision shall prevail.”75 The 
Muslim Code goes even further, conditioning the wife’s acquisi-
tion of property from non-relatives on her husband’s consent.76 
It further denies mothers the ability to administer children’s 
property unless the father is absent77 and grants guardianship of 
a minor’s property to the father, paternal grandfather, their rep-
resentatives, or the court.78 Once again, not just the father, but 
other men and even the court take precedence over the mother. 
[N]either the Family nor 
Muslim Codes recognize 
women’s equal responsibility 
and authority in the 
upbringing of their children.
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However, the Magna Carta of Women and CEDAW recognize 
the equal rights of both spouses in the “ownership, acquisition, 
administration, enjoyment, and disposition of property.”79 
Women’s property rights are critical since they are closely 
linked to economic power. The CEDAW Committee considers 
them “central to a woman’s right to enjoy financial indepen-
dence” and “her ability to earn a livelihood and to provide 
adequate housing and nutrition for herself and for her family.”80 
When men have final authority over property, they have ultimate 
access to wealth, and women are disempowered and dependent. 
The Philippines acknowledged “inequality in the legal capacity 
of women . . . within marriage and family relations which affect 
their rights over . . . land ownership,”81 and that Filipino women 
suffer from “massive poverty and inequality in the ownership 
of economic resources.”82 The Constitution calls for “a more 
equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth”83 
and reduction of “social, economic, and political inequalities.”84 
These goals require reform of the Family and Muslim codes.
Although the discriminatory parental authority and property 
provisions in the Family Code allow a woman to contest her hus-
band’s decision through “recourse to the court” 85 or “a judicial 
order to the contrary,”86 such a remedy is illusory and does not 
alleviate discrimination. Court procedure requires resources and 
time. Additionally, bringing suit against her husband would lead 
to marital conflict and is not necessarily a realistic option for a 
woman who wants to maintain her marriage. Moreover, provi-
sions that require women to overcome extra hurdles to uphold 
their decision-making authority violate the basic premise of 
equal protection.87 
muSlim women are denied additional rightS baSed 
on their religion
Muslim women are doubly marginalized and subject to addi-
tional discriminatory provisions under the Muslim Code on the 
basis of their religion. The Human Rights Committee noted that 
“[d]iscrimination against women is often intertwined with dis-
crimination on other grounds such as . . . religion.”88 This is the 
case here, and the Committee on the Rights of the Child urged 
a “more active approach” to eliminate discrimination against 
women and girls “belonging to minorities (or ‘cultural communi-
ties’).”89 Discriminatory treatment based on religion violates the 
Constitution,90 Organic Act,91 and international human rights law.92 
The Muslim Code’s assignment of gender roles within the 
family reinforces gender inequality and violates basic rights. 
The Code mandates, “The wife shall dutifully manage the affairs 
of the household. She may purchase things necessary for the 
maintenance of the family, and her husband shall . . . reimburse 
the expenses.”93 However, CEDAW requires the elimination 
of discrimination based on “stereotyped roles for men and 
women.”94 The Philippine government itself acknowledged that 
“[s]ex stereotyping remains a stumbling block to women’s full 
development.”95 This provision additionally violates the right of 
married couples to be free from state intervention in private fam-
ily affairs under the Constitution96 and ICCPR.97
The Muslim Code also violates a woman’s right to engage 
in the profession of her choice. A wife is required to obtain her 
husband’s consent to “exercise any profession or occupation or 
engage in lawful business.”98 Moreover, a woman’s profession 
must comply with “Islamic modesty and virtue.”99 The Magna 
Carta of Women requires “the same personal rights between 
spouses,” including “the right to choose freely a profession and 
an occupation.”100 Likewise, CEDAW calls on states to “ensure, 
on a basis of equality of men and women . . . the right to choose 
. . . a profession and an occupation.”101
The Muslim Code further provides that “[t]he husband shall 
fix the residence of the family,”102 disregarding the wife’s opin-
ion or consent. CEDAW explicitly accords “to men and women 
the same rights with regard . . . to the movement of persons and 
the freedom to choose their residence and domicile.”103 The 
CEDAW Committee further elaborated that residence, “like 
nationality, should be capable of change at will by an adult 
woman regardless of her marital status.”104 The Supreme Court 
also recognized the importance of a woman’s right to choose a 
residence when it ruled that a widow is not bound to her last 
marital home.105 In his opinion, Justice Romero instructed, “All 
obstacles to women’s full participation in decision-making at all 
levels, including the family’ should be removed.”106
The Muslim Code additionally limits the right of Muslim 
women to be recognized by courts. It specifies when a wife may 
sue or be sued and, in most instances, requires her husband to 
be joined to the suit.107 This prevents women’s full enforcement 
of their rights and violates the ICCPR’s mandate of equality 
“before the law”108 and “before the courts and tribunals.”109 
Furthermore, CEDAW requires that states “accord to women, 
in civil matters, a legal capacity identical to that of men and the 
same opportunities to exercise that capacity.”110 The Philippine 
government admitted that “inequality in the legal capacity of 
women” affects “their rights over concluding contracts, land 
ownership and property administration.”111 Women are thus 
treated as minors and forced into dependence on men. 
the diScriminatory proViSionS cannot be juStified by 
protection of family harmony, culture, or religion
Although the trial court maintains that the discriminatory 
provisions of the Family and Muslim Code are justified by pro-
tection of family harmony, culture, and religion, this argument 
has no basis and violates human rights law. The challenged 
provisions are, in fact, contrary to family harmony, culture, and 
religion.
family harmony
In Asjari v. Ermita, the trial court upheld the discriminatory 
provisions of the Family and Muslim Codes in order to maintain 
“family solidarity” and “harmony”112 and prevent a “constant 
impasse”113 in family decision-making. It considered provisions 
that grant the husband ultimate authority “laudable,”114 “neces-
sary and practical” 115 in avoiding conflict. The drafters of these 
provisions of the Family Code were similarly motivated. They 
determined, “as a solution to the conflict[s] between the spouses 
and following the tradition of the husband being the head of the 
family, he should be allowed to decide.”116
However, mandating a husband’s authority does not advance 
and is, in fact, detrimental to family harmony. It sets family rela-
tions which are not based on equality and mutual respect. As the 
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CEDAW Committee explained, “A stable family is one which is 
based on principles of equity, justice and individual fulfillment 
for each member.”117 Furthermore, under the Family and Muslim 
Codes, a husband’s decision has legal force, and to contest it, the 
wife must seek “recourse [from] the court”118 and obtain “a 
judicial order to the contrary.”119 This encouragement of litiga-
tion is not in the best interests of family harmony. Rather, a 
husband and wife should persuade, negotiate, and compromise, 
using court guidance only as a last resort. Countries where laws 
do not enforce a discriminatory preference for patriarchy do not 
suffer from the feared “vacuum in family decision-making.”120 
As Justice Puno recognized, 
“gender-based discrimination. 
. . .  is not rationally related 
to the objective of promoting 
family solidarity.”121
culture and religion
In Asjari v. Ermita, the trial 
court held that “the prefer-
ence for men over women may 
be religion or culture-based, 
not sexual discrimination.”122 
Such an exception to women’s 
equality would be wide enough 
to swallow the right entirely 
and is prohibited by Philippine 
and international law. 
Relying on custom, the 
trial court explained that the 
husband should have ultimate 
authority over property “because tradition and experience show 
that, in very serious matters concerning the family, it is usually 
the husband who makes ultimate choices.”123 However, dis-
criminatory cultural practices cannot be justified as traditions 
of a patriarchal society under either Philippine or international 
law. The Organic Act provides for “respect and protection of . . . 
customs and traditions . . . [p]rovided, [t]hat no person . . . shall, 
on the basis of . . . sex, be subjected to any form of discrimina-
tion.”124 The Family and Muslim Codes themselves recognize 
the subordination of custom to law and the preeminence of the 
Constitution.125 CEDAW requires states to “abolish . . . customs 
and practices which constitute discrimination against women”126 
and to “modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of 
men and women” “based on the idea of the inferiority or the 
superiority of either of the sexes.”127 The Philippine government 
has, in fact, expressed its commitment to put a “high priority 
on the transformation of society’s attitudes and values towards 
the recognition of the equal roles, rights and responsibilities of 
women.”128
Similarly, freedom of religion is not absolute and cannot 
infringe on the fundamental rights and freedoms of women.129 
As the Human Rights Committee explained, “traditional, his-
torical, religious, or cultural attitudes” can never “justify vio-
lations of women’s rights to equality before the law.”130 The 
Supreme Court recognized that freedom of religion protects 
beliefs but does not excuse illegal actions.131 It further defined 
the “essence” of religious freedom as “freedom from confor-
mity to religious dogma,”132 the opposite of the Muslim Code’s 
approach. 
Moreover, the court failed to recognize that culture is 
non-uniform and dynamic and did not question whether the 
Muslim Code provisions accurately reflect the beliefs of Filipino 
Muslims. As discussed, the discriminatory provisions in the 
Muslim Code are “a virtual restatement of . . . the Spanish 
Civil Code of 1889,” manifesting this period’s Spanish Catholic 
traditions.133 Furthermore, Filipino Muslims “traditionally have 
not been a closely knit or even allied group . . . [and differ] in 
their degree of Islamic orthodoxy.”134 Islamic laws also “change 
with the passage of time and 
with the change of place or 
circumstance.”135 According to 
Justice Rasul, Chairman of the 
Philippine Shari’a Department, 
“the reliance on male in guard-
ianship is stressed due perhaps 
to social traditions . . . and con-
servatism. Circumstances may, 
however, give rise to reliance 
on women.”136 Many Muslim 
nations, including Algeria, 
Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey, 
provide for equal treatment for 
women while remaining faith-
ful to Islamic traditions.137 In 
fact, some scholars maintain 
that Islam has a gender equal 
view of domestic roles.138 
Thus, by enforcing a particu-
lar view of Islam, the state 
actually goes against freedom of religion and violates people’s 
“freedom from conformity to religious dogma.”139
harmS by the current regime 
harmS to phySical integrity: domeStic Violence
By encouraging husbands to dominate decision-making and 
wives to submissively follow, the Family and Muslim Codes per-
petuate power structures that facilitate domestic violence. The 
CEDAW Committee identified “[t]raditional attitudes by which 
women are regarded as subordinate to men or as having stereo-
typed roles” as “perpetuat[ing] . . . family violence and abuse.”140 
The Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women 
likewise characterizes “violence against women” as “a manifes-
tation of historically unequal power relations between men and 
women.”141 Moreover, by economically disempowering women, 
the Family and Muslim Codes increase women’s vulnerability 
to violence. As the CEDAW Committee recognized, “Lack of 
economic independence forces many women to stay in violent 
relationships.”142
A Philippine study found that a husband’s domination of 
decision-making establishes a pattern of his control and the 
wife’s subordination.143 Thus, “the more domains of decision-
making men dominate, the more likely they are to dominate their 
wives in terms of physical abuse.”144 By contrast, “when couples 
make decisions together (both major and minor decisions), fewer 
The antiquated provisions 
in the Family and Muslim 
Codes violate women’s 
rights to equality, dignity, 
property, choice of 
residence and profession, 
and access to justice.
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women experience [domestic violence].”145 Domestic violence 
is, moreover, specifically correlated with a husband’s control of 
parental authority and property. Domestic violence was found to 
be “significantly more common if husbands have the final say over 
decisions in . . . buying the children clothes, choosing the children’s 
school, taking the child to the doctor . . . buying or selling land.”146 
Under international law, states must “take positive measures 
to eliminate all forms of violence against women.”147 Domestic 
violence is a violation in itself148 and perpetuates further viola-
tions of women’s rights.149 It places “women’s health at risk and 
impair[s] their ability to participate in family life and public 
life.”150 One out of ten Filipino women experiences domestic 
abuse.151 It is time to take action to stop this abuse.
harmS to dignity: treatment aS minorS 
The discriminatory provisions in the Family and Muslim 
Codes treat Filipino women as less than full adults capable of 
controlling their lives in violation of their dignity. Under these 
Codes, women must defer to their husband in raising their chil-
dren, managing property, litigating their affairs, and choosing 
their profession and residence. This treatment as minors violates 
women’s right to dignity, enshrined in the Constitution152 and 
international law.153 CEDAW highlights the close connection 
between equality and dignity: Since “all human beings are born 
free and equal in dignity and rights . . . discrimination against 
women violates . . . human dignity.”154 Justice Romero echoed this 
connection and explained, “Demeaning to the wife’s dignity are 
certain strictures on her personal freedoms, practically relegating 
her to the position of minors and disabled persons.”155 
concluSion
The antiquated provisions in the Family and Muslim Codes 
violate women’s rights to equality, dignity, property, choice of 
residence and profession, and access to justice. They are also 
contrary to the best interests of children and cannot be justi-
fied by protection of family harmony, culture, or religion. The 
Spanish law on which they are based has been long revised, and 
they are particularly outdated with passage of the Magna Carta 
of Women, dedicated to promoting women’s equality. Justice 
Romero referred to an “enlightened global trend to recognize 
and protect the human rights of women, no less than men.”156 It 
is time to heed his words and finally give human rights guaran-
tees meaning for Filipino women.
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